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Abstract— We consider an inventory competition game be-
tween two firms. The question we address is this: If players do
not know the opponent’s action and opponent’s utility function
can they learn to play the Nash policy in a repeated game
by observing their own sales? In this work it is proven that
by means of Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimation, players
can learn the Nash policy. It is proven that players’ actions and
beliefs do converge to the Nash equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
Assume two players are engaged in a strategic learning
process in which they play a one-stage game repeatedly. In
a one-stage game, at the beginning of every stage players
order inventory levels by incurring ordering costs, and then
a random demand occurs. If a player meets the demand
she/he collects revenues. If a player has extra inventory levels
at the end of the stage, she/he will incur holding costs.
A proportion of any unmet demand will switch to another
player. In this game the objective of every player is to make
ordering decisions so as to maximize her/his own expected
revenue.
We consider a scenario in which every player is informed
of her/his own utility function but does not know the op-
ponent’s utility function. Each player knows both her/his
own local demand distribution and the opponent’s local
demand distribution, but she/he cannot observe the current
and past actions of the opponent. Players observe their own
sales and remember their own previous sales. Players’ sales
contain information about the opponent’s action. Each player
constructs a belief about the opponent’s strategy set such that
includes opponent’s Nash policy; i.e., player i (Pi) assumes
that the opponent plays a threshold policy with a uniform
distribution over [0, aj ]. A player’s belief is a conditional
probability density function over the opponent’s strategies
given the previous sales. At every stage of the repeated game,
players observe their own sales and then update their beliefs
about their opponent’s strategy set. At every stage of the
repeated game, every player has a belief about the opponent’s
strategy set. At every stage of the repeated game, players
compute the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimation of
their belief and play their best response to that strategy.
The studies most related to this work are [1]- [5]. Authors
in [2], [3], and [4] address the competitive inventory game.
Various authors have argued the convergence to Nash equi-
librium in games with a finite strategy set (see [5], [6] and
[7]).
A. Notation
(.)+ = max(., 0).
di : Local demand faced by player i = 1, 2,
are non-negative-valued independent random variables,
with a continuous density function.
fdi : Local demand’s density function for Pi; i = 1, 2.
ξni : Random outcome for local demand di at stage n.
ci : Unit variable ordering cost for Pi (ci > 0).
hi : Unit holding cost for Pi (hi > 0).
ri : Unit selling price for Pi (ri > 0).
yi : Pi’s action in one-stage game (yi ≥ 0).
αi : Proportion of unmet demand that switches from
Pj to Pi.
d¯i := di + αi (dj − yj)+, Pi’s total demand.
Fd¯i(yj) : Cumulative distribution function of Pi’s total
demand given yj .
gi(y1, y2) := ri min{yi, d¯i} − hi(yi − d¯i)+ − ciyi.
Gi(y1, y2) := Ed1,d2 gi(y1, y2), Pi’s utility function where
Ed1,d2 means expectation over local demands d1 and d2.
yni : Optimal inventory level for Pi at stage n, where
yni = arg max
yi
Gi(yi, y¯j), in which
y¯j = arg max
yj
fn(yj |Ini ).
sni : Pi’s sales at stage n,
sni = min(y
n
i , ξ
n
i + (ξ
n
j − ynj )+), i 6= j = 1, 2.
Ini : Pi’s information vector at stage n, I
1
i =
{
gi(.)
}
,
In+1i = I
n
i ∪
{
(sni , y
n
i )
}
, n = 1, 2, ....
BRi(.) : Pi’s best response to ’.’, where
BRi(.) = arg max
yi
Gi(yi, .).
B. One-Stage Game
Consider two players i ∈ {1, 2} without initial inventory
levels. Each player i brings his inventory level to yi, where
yi ≥ 0, by incurring the total ordering cost ciyi, where ci ≥ 0
is the variable ordering cost per unit. Then each player i
receives the random demand di from the customers for whom
player i is the first choice. If the demand dj is unmet by
player j, i.e., dj > yj , then a fixed proportion αi ∈ [0, 1]
of this unmet demand (dj − yj)+ switches to player i 6= j.
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Therefore, the total demand faced by player i becomes
d¯i(yj) = di + αi(dj − yj)+
in which (.)+ = max(., 0). We will suppress the dependence
of d¯i on yj when there is no possibility of confusion.
Subsequently, player i collects the revenues ri min{yi, d¯i}
and incurs the holding cost hi(yi− d¯i)+ where ri > 0 is the
unit revenue and hi > 0 is the unit holding cost. As a result,
player i’s utility function is given as
Gi(y1, y2) = Ed1,d2 gi(y1, y2),
where the expectation is taken with respect to (d1, d2) and
gi(y1, y2) = ri min{yi, d¯i} − hi(yi − d¯i)+ − ciyi.
We denote the game characterized by the utility functions
given above and the strategy sets {[0,∞)}i∈{1,2} as Γ.
C. Repeated Games
Player’s utility function, given actions (y1, y2), is
G1(y1, y2) = Ed1,d2 g1(y1, y2),
G2(y1, y2) = Ed1,d2 g2(y1, y2);
the expectation is over local demands d1 and d2, in which
d¯1 = d1 + α1(d2 − y2)+,
d¯2 = d2 + α2(d1 − y1)+,
g1(y1, y2) = r1 min{y1, d¯1} − h1(y1 − d¯1)+ − c1y1,
g2(y1, y2) = r2 min{y2, d¯2} − h2(y2 − d¯2)+ − c2y2.
In repeated games, players try to maximize their own utility
function given their belief about their opponent’s strat-
egy. Assume the information vectors {In1 , In2 } and beliefs
{fn(y1|In2 ), fn(y2|In1 )} at stage n are given. The learning
process at stage n is given below:
1) Players choose optimal actions (yn1 , y
n
2 ), given their
belief about the opponent’s action:
y¯1 = arg max
y1
fn(y1|In2 ),
y¯2 = arg max
y2
fn(y2|In1 ),
yn1 = arg max
y1
G1(y1, y¯2),
yn2 = arg max
y2
G2(y¯1, y2).
2) Demands occur, and players observe their own sales:
sn1 = min(y
n
1 , ξ
n
1 + (ξ
n
2 − yn2 )+),
sn2 = min(y
n
2 , ξ
n
2 + (ξ
n
1 − yn1 )+)
where ξn1 and ξ
n
2 are defined as random outcomes
respectively for local demands d1 and d2 at stage n
with density functions fd1 and fd2 .
3) Players update their information vectors:
In+11 = I
n
1 ∪
{
(sn1 , y
n
1 )
}
,
In+12 = I
n
2 ∪
{
(sn2 , y
n
2 )
}
.
4) Players update their beliefs about the distribution of
the opponent’s strategy:
fn+1(y1|In+12 ) = f(s
n
2 |y1,yn2 )fn(y1|In2 )∫
f(sn2 |y1,yn2 )fn(y1|In2 )dy1 ,
fn+1(y2|In+11 ) = f(s
n
1 |y2,yn1 )fn(y2|In1 )∫
f(sn1 |y2,yn1 )fn(y2|In1 )dy2 .(1)
The learning process at stage n+ 1 is similar to stage n. In
this work it will be shown that (yn1 , y
n
2 ) → (y∗1 , y∗2) where
(y∗1 , y
∗
2) is the Nash equilibrium:
y∗1 = arg max
y1
G1(y1, y
∗
2) = arg max
y1
E g1(y1, y
∗
2),
y∗2 = arg max
y2
G2(y
∗
1 , y2) = arg max
y2
E g2(y
∗
1 , y2),
in which
d¯∗1 = d1 + α1(d2 − y∗2)+,
d¯∗2 = d2 + α2(d1 − y∗1)+,
g1(y1, y
∗
2) = r1 min{y1, d¯∗1} − h1(y1 − d¯∗1)+ − c1y1,
g2(y
∗
1 , y2) = r2 min{y2, d¯∗2} − h2(y2 − d¯∗2)+ − c2y2.
II. DISCRETE LEARNING MODEL
At the first stage there is no sales history, and the infor-
mation vector is given as I1i =
{
gi(.)
}
. Pi supposes that
Pj plays a threshold policy with a uniform distribution on
[0, aj ], therefore the initial belief is the continuous density
function f1(yj |I1i ) = 1/aj for 0 ≤ yj ≤ aj . It is noticeable
that y∗j ∈ [0, aj ]. To make the model discrete, for example, let
step size be ∆. Pi’s discrete belief about the distribution of
Pj’s strategy at stage n is µni = [µ
n
i (1) µ
n
i (2) · · ·µni (Mi)],
where Mi = daj∆ e and µni (k), k = 1, ...,Mi stands for the
probability that Pj’s strategy will be (k − 1)∆ ≤ yj < k∆,
given Ini . It is noticeable that
∑Mi
j=1 µ
n
i (j) = 1.
At the first stage, Pi’s initial discrete belief about Pj’s
action, yj , is µ1i = [µ
1
i (1) µ
1
i (2) · · ·µ1i (Mi)], in which
µ1i (k) =
∫ k∆
(k−1)∆ f
1(yj |I1i )dyj
∆
.
At the first stage, players choose the optimal actions given
their belief about the distribution of the opponent’s strategy.
Then demands occur, and players observe their own sales and
update their belief about the distribution of the opponent’s
strategy based on Bayes’s rule.
At the second stage, the information vector is
I2i =
{
I1i , (s
1
i , y
1
i )
}
, and Pi’s discrete belief about
opponent’s action is µ2i = [µ
2
i (1) µ
2
i (2) · · ·µ2i (Mi)], where
µ2i (k) =
∫ k∆
(k−1)∆ f
2(yj |I2i )dyj
∆ , k = 1, 2, ...,Mi. (2)
From (1),
f2(yj |I2i ) = f(s
1
i |yj ,y1i )f1(yj |I1i )∫ aj
0 f(s
1
i |yj ,y1i )f1(yj |I1i )dyj
. (3)
From (2) and (3),
µ2i (k) =
∫ k∆
(k−1)∆ f(s
1
i |yj ,y1i )f1(yj |I1i )dyj
∆
∫ aj
0 f(s
1
i |yj ,y1i )f1(yj |I1i )dyj
,
µ2i (k) ≈
µ1i (k)
∫ k∆
(k−1)∆ f(s
1
i |yj ,y1i )dyj
∆
∑M
l=1 µ
1
i (l)
∫ l∆
(l−1)∆ f(s
1
i |yj ,y1i )dyj
.
Discrete local demands are
Pd1(k) =
∫ k∆
(k−1)∆ fd1dd1
∆ for k = 1, ..., N1,
Pd2(k) =
∫ k∆
(k−1)∆ fd2dd2
∆ for k = 1, ..., N2.
It is noticeable that∑N1
k=1 Pd1(k) = 1,∑N2
k=1 Pd2(k) = 1,∫ k∆
(k−1)∆ f(s
1
i |yj , y1i )dyj =
∑
(l,m)∈A
Pd1 (l)Pd2 (m)
∆2 ,
where A is defined as
A = {(l,m)∣∣ 1 ≤ l ≤ N1, 1 ≤ m ≤ N2 s1i ∈ [a, b]},
a = min
(
y1i , (l − 1)∆ + αi((m− 1)∆− k∆)+
)
,
b = min
(
y1i , l∆ + αi(m∆− (k − 1)∆)+
)
.
Example 1: Consider the case ri = 4, hi = 0.6, αi = 1,
c1 = 2, c2 = 1 and f(di) = 1 for 0 ≤ di ≤ 1, i = 1, 2.
To make the model discrete, let step size be ∆ = 0.01. In
figures 1 and 2, it is shown that by means of MAP estimation
players’ actions and beliefs converge to the Nash equilibrium
(0.45, 0.79).
Fig. 1. Convergence of actions to the Nash equilibrium (0.45, 0.79)
III. CONVERGENCE TO THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM
At the first stage, P1 believes that P2 will choose a policy
in the interval B1 = [b1, b1] with density function f
1(y2|I11 ),
and similarly, P2 believes that P1 will choose a policy in
the interval B2 = [b2, b2] with density function f
1(y1|I12 ).
Proposition 1 means that there exists an interval U ⊂ B1
such that P2 will not play any policy in U .
Fig. 2. Convergence of beliefs to the Nash equilibrium (0.45, 0.79)
Proposition 1: For at least one of the players, without loss
of generality for P1, there exists an interval U = [b1 β) or
U = (β b1] or U = [b1 β) ∪ (β b1], such that yn2 /∈ U ⊂
B1 = [b1 b1] for n = 1, 2, .... This means that P2 will never
play any policy in U . Proof is given in the Appendix.
It is noticeable that the set U can always be found unless
b1 = b1 = y
∗
2 and b2 = b2 = y
∗
1 .
Proposition 2 means that if there exists an interval U ⊂ B1
such that P2 does not choose any policy in U then P1 will
eventually figure out that yn2 /∈ U .
Proposition 2: If there exists an interval U , without loss
of generality U = (β b1], such that yn2 /∈ U for n = N,N +
1, ..., then for any given  > 0,
P
(
lim
n−→∞ arg maxy2
fn(y2|In1 ) /∈ (β¯ +  b1]
)
= 1.
Proof is given in the Appendix.
Theorem: Players’ actions in the demand competition
game will converge to the Nash equilibrium, (y∗1 , y
∗
2), by
MAP.
Proof: At the first stage, P1 believes that P2 will choose
a policy in the interval B1 = [b11, b
1
1] with density function
f1(y2|I11 ), and similarly, P2 believes that P1 will choose a
policy in the interval B2 = [b12, b
1
2] with density function
f1(y1|I12 ).
Without loss of generality, assume
BR2(b
1
2) < b
1
1,
b12 < BR1(b
1
1).
Here the worst-case is considered, in which
y∗1 = b
1
2,
y∗2 = b
1
1.
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 1 < b
1
1 −
BR2(b
1
2) there exists an N1 such that P (AN1,1) = 1,
An, = {arg max
y2
fk(y2|Ik1 ) ∈ [b11 BR2(b12) + ]|∀k ≥ n}.
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 2 <
BR1(b
1
1)− b12 there exists an N2 such that P (BN2,2) = 1,
Bn, = {arg max
y1
fk(y1|Ik2 ) ∈ [BR1(b
1
1)−  b
1
2]|∀k ≥ n}.
Let define,
[b21 b
2
1] := [b
1
1 BR2(b
1
2) + 1],
[b22 b
2
2] := [BR1(b
1
1)− 2 b
1
2],
n1 = max(N1, N2).
According to Proposition 2, for n ≥ n1, P (An,1) = 1 and
P (Bn,2) = 1; therefore,
arg max
y2
fk(y2|Ik1 ) ∈ [b21 b
2
1] ∀ k ≥ n1,
arg max
y1
fk(y1|Ik2 ) ∈ [b22 b
2
2] ∀ k ≥ n1.
It is evident that b
2
1 < b
1
1 and b
2
2 > b
1
2. According to
Proposition 1, without loss of generality, assume
BR2(b
2
2) < b
2
1,
b22 < BR1(b
2
1).
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 3 <
BR2(b
1
2) − BR2(b22) there exists an N3 such that
P (AN3,3) = 1,
An, = {arg max
y2
fk(y2|Ik1 ) ∈ [b21 BR2(b22) + ]|∀k ≥ n}.
According to Proposition 2, for the given 0 < 4 <
BR1(b
2
1) − BR1(b
1
1) there exists an N4 such that
P (BN4,4) = 1,
Bn, = {arg max
y1
fk(y1|Ik2 ) ∈ [BR1(b
2
1)−  b
2
2]|∀k ≥ n}.
Let define,
[b31 b
3
1] := [b
2
1 BR2(b
2
2) + 3],
[b32 b
3
2] := [BR1(b
2
1)− 4 b
2
2],
n2 = max(N3, N4).
According to Proposition 2, for n ≥ n2, P (An,3) = 1 and
P (Bn,4) = 1; therefore,
arg max
y2
fk(y2|Ik1 ) ∈ [b31 b
3
1] for ∀k ≥ n2,
arg max
y1
fk(y1|Ik2 ) ∈ [b32 b
3
2] for ∀k ≥ n2.
According to Proposition 1, without loss of generality, as-
sume
BR2(b
3
2) < b
3
1,
b32 < BR1(b
3
1).
Because b32 > BR1(b
1
1) and because according to Proposition
2, for the given 0 < 5 < BR2(BR1(b
1
1))− BR2(b32) there
exists an N5 such that P (AN5,5) = 1, where
An, = {arg max
y2
fk(y2|Ik1 ) ∈ [b31 BR2(b32) + ]∀k ≥ n}.
Because b
3
1 < BR2(b
1
2) and because according to Proposition
2, for the given 0 < 6 < BR1(b
3
1)− BR1(BR2(b12)) there
exists an N6 such that P (BN6,6) = 1, where
Bn, = {arg max
y1
fk(y1|Ik2 ) ∈ [BR1(b
3
1)−  b
3
2]∀k ≥ n}.
Let define,
[b41 b
4
1] := [b
3
1 BR2(b
3
2) + 5],
[b42 b
4
2] := [BR1(b
3
1)− 6 b
3
2].
It is easy to check that b42 > BR1(BR2(b
1
2)) and
b
4
1 < BR2(BR1(b
1
1)). Similarly, a sequence Nn, Nn+1, ...
can be found such that
b
Nn
1 < BR2(BR1(BR2...BR1(b
1
1)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ntimes
and
bNn2 > BR1(BR2(BR1...BR2(b
1
2)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ntimes
.
Let
Φni (.) := BRi(BR−i(...BRi(.)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ntimes
,
because of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium,
Φni (yi) −→ y∗i . For the given δ > 0 there exists an
n˜ such that for n > n˜, |Φni (yi) − y∗i | < δ; hence for
n > N1 +N2 + ...+Nn˜, |bn1 − y∗2 | < δ and |bn2 − y∗1 | < δ.
In summary, by using Proposition 1 and 2 an infinite
sequence of sets, {Bi, B1i , B2i , ...} can be found such that
Bi ⊃ B1i ⊃ B2i ⊃ ..., in which
1) Bni = [b
n
i b
n
i ],
2) arg maxy2 f
m(y2|Im1 ) ∈ Bni , m = Nn, Nn+1, ...
3) bni −→ Φnj (bj) and b
n
i −→ Φnj (bj)
Therefore convergence to the Nash equilibrium follows.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This work introduce a two-player competitive game in
which players do not know the opponent’s utility function
and the opponent’s action. It is shown that players can learn
the Nash equilibrium by engaging in a strategic learning
process in which they play a one-shot game repeatedly.
Players construct a belief about their opponent’s strategy set
and play their best response to the Maximium A Posteriori
(MAP) of their beliefs. In every stage players observe their
own sales and update their beliefs about their opponent’s
strategy set. It is proven that players’ beliefs and actions
will converge to the Nash equilibrium. Future work can be
done that would investigate the case in which players do not
know their opponent’s local demand distribution.
V. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
According to [1]- [5] the Nash equilibrium is unique. It can
be claimed that 2) and 3) cannot be satisfied simultaneously
unless (b2, b1) = (y
∗
1 , y
∗
2). Similarly, 1) and 4) cannot be
satisfied simultaneously unless (b2, b1) = (y
∗
1 , y
∗
2).
1) b1 ≥ BR2(b2),
2) b1 ≤ BR2(b2),
3) b2 ≥ BR1(b1),
4) b2 ≤ BR1(b1).
Suppose 2) and 3) are satisfied, since best response functions
are nonincreasing (Proposition 1 part 2b); therefore,
b1 ≤ BR2(b2) ≤ BR2(BR1(b1))
≤ BR2(BR1(BR2(b2)))
≤ BR2(BR1(BR2(BR1(b1))))
≤ · · · ; (5)
the odd-numbered inequalities result from 2) and the even-
numbered inequalities result from 3). From Proposition 1
part 4) it is evident that (5) contradicts the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium unless (b2, b1) = (y
∗
1 , y
∗
2) because the
initial assumption was that y∗2 ∈ [b1 b1].
Similarly, suppose 1) and 4) are satisfied, then
b1 ≥ BR2(b2) ≥ BR2(BR1(b1))
≥ BR2(BR1(BR2(b2)))
≥ BR2(BR1(BR2(BR1(b1))))
≥ · · · ; (6)
the odd-numbered inequalities result from 1) and the even-
numbered inequalities result from 4). It is evident that (6)
contradicts the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium unless
(b2, b1) = (y
∗
1 , y
∗
2), because the initial assumption was that
y∗2 ∈ [b1 b1].
It is assumed, without loss of generality, that b1 >
BR2(b2). Because the best response functions are nonin-
creasing (Proposition 1), it follows that
b1 > β = BR2(b2) ≥ BR2(y1)(7)
= arg max
y2
G2(y1, y2) ∀y1 ∈ [b2 b2].
Therefore, yn2 /∈ U = (β b1], n = 1, 2, ....
The case U = [b1 β) and U = [b1 β)∪(β b1] can be proved
in the same manner.
B. Proof of Proposition 3
It is easy to check that
f(y2|In+11 ) =
f(y2|I11 )f(s11|y2, y11)...f(sn1 |y2, yn1 )∫
f(y2|I11 )f(s11|y2, y11)...f(sn1 |y2, yn1 )dy2
,
max
y2
logf(y2|In+11 ) = maxy2
n∑
m=1
logf(sm1 |y2, ym1 ).
Lemma: For every y2 6= yn2
E {logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )} < E {logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )},
where the conditional expectation is taken with respect to sn1
given yn2 .
Proof:
E {logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )} − E {logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )}
= E {logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )− logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )}
= E {log f(s
n
1 |y2, yn1 )
f(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )
}
≤
log{E f(s
n
1 |y2, yn1 )
f(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )
}
= log{
∫
A
f(sn1 |y2, yn1 )
f(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )
f(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )dsn1}
= log{
∫
A
f(sn1 |y2, yn1 )dsn1}
in which A = {sn1 : f(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 ) > 0}.
It is evident that
∫
A
f(sn1 |y2, yn1 )dsn1 < 1, unless y2 = yn2 ;
therefore,
E{logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )} < E{logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )}
and by taking sum over n
1
N
N∑
n=1
E{logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )} <
1
N
N∑
n=1
E{logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )}.
From [8] (page 418)
1
N
N∑
n=1
E{logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )} −
1
N
N∑
n=1
{logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )} −→ 0,
1
N
N∑
n=1
E{logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )} −
1
N
N∑
n=1
{logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )} −→ 0,
therefore
lim
1
N
N∑
n=1
{logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )} < lim
1
N
N∑
n=1
{logf(sn1 |yn2 , yn1 )}.
and let Y2 be Y2 = {y12 , y22 , ...}, then
supy2 /∈Y2 lim
1
N
∑N
n=1{logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )}
<
supy2∈Y2 lim
1
N
∑N
n=1{logf(sn1 |y2, yn1 )}.
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